

Russian Society Monitoring

MIRROR OF RUSSIA

Wave
10

Dynamics of Change: 2022–2026



The Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia

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Research Methodology



Survey Methodology: CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interview) – telephone survey on an interactive structured questionnaire using software for conducting sociological surveys.

Field dates: 11.05-26.05.2026

Sample size: 1600 respondents.

Sample type: Sample type for the All-Russian survey: The sample is proportionally stratified according to the characteristics “8 federal districts of the Russian Federation” and “type of settlements” (urban/rural population; for the Central Federal District - Moscow and St. Petersburg/other urban population/rural population).

For each stratum, gender and age quotas were calculated – men/women in 5 age groups (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-59 and 60 years and older).

The sample reproduces the geographical parameters and sex-age proportions of the general population – all adults (18 years and older) residents of the Russian Federation.

The statistical error with a probability of 0.95 does not exceed 2.5%.

Research Summary



War has once again become the number one concern for Russians, and they would like it to end as soon as possible

The Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia (IKAR) conducted a sociological survey as part of its monitoring of Russian society, called the "Mirror of Russia." The 10th wave was conducted from May 11 to 26, 2026, using a nationwide sample. The survey methodology was CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interview), a telephone survey by interactive structured questionnaire using special software for sociological surveys. A total of 1,600 respondents were interviewed. The statistical error, with a probability of 0.95, does not exceed 2.5%.

Key survey findings:

1. Compared to last year, significant changes were recorded in public sentiment regarding the war and its impact on Russians' daily lives: Russians once again ranked the "Special Military Operation" as the most pressing issue in the Russian Federation (33%), while low wages and high prices ranked second and third (24% and 18%, respectively). This reverses the trend of recent years, when prices and wages became the primary concerns for Russians, while the war was relegated to third or fourth place. Thus, the war has once again become an important factor in Russians' daily lives, moving from being a background event to a more important one.
2. In the Russian public consciousness, there is a logical connection between the war and their own financial situation, as research from previous years has documented. Therefore, according to Russians, the president's top priorities for Russia's development in 2026 should be a successful conclusion to the war and an improvement in the financial situation of Russians—both options receive 58% of the vote. Moreover, these priorities significantly outpace other alternatives.

Research Summary



3. 94% of Russians have noticed an increase in the prices of goods and services in their everyday purchases. These figures are identical to those obtained in the 2025 study. Moreover, their assessments of their purchasing capabilities over the last six months of this year were worse, and they are even more skeptical about what it will be like by the end of the year: compared to last year's study, skepticism among Russians increased from 54% to 62%.

4. About half of Russians (47%) believe that Russia has partially or fully achieved its military goals in Ukraine. This is significantly lower than a year ago, when this figure was 54%. However, 46% of Russians would like the war to end no later than six months. This represents a 5% increase compared to last year. Overall, since December 2022, the number of Russians who wanted the war to end as quickly as possible has steadily increased, from 24% to 46% this year.

Meanwhile, the number of Russians who favored a war without a time limit, ending in complete victory, has decreased from 13% to 9%, the lowest level in all four years of the full-scale phase of the war.

5. The change in Russian sentiment is also demonstrated by a follow-up question about support for ending the war tomorrow: an absolute majority of Russians – 81% – would support such a move. This is the highest figure in all four years. Since 2023, it has remained at 72-75%.

Research Summary



6. Among Russians, the proportion who have someone mobilized since the beginning of the full-scale invasion is growing. This study showed a share of 74%. At the same time, the number of respondents who have had someone from their inner circle—family members or friends—serve in the Russian army is growing. Currently, the share of respondents who have mobilized one or more family members is 31%. This compares to 14% in 2022. Correspondingly, the number of Russians who have lost someone in the war is growing: only 29% report that no one among their relatives or friends died in combat. According to the latest data, 21% of Russians had one or more relatives who died during the full-scale phase of the war. In the last year alone, this share increased from 15% to 21%. In December 2022, this share was only 2%. The share of those who have lost a friend is also steadily growing. Currently, this share is 22%, compared to only 6% in December 2022.

7. Russian society remains clearly opposed to a second wave of forced mobilization similar to that of autumn 2022 – approximately three-quarters (73%) of respondents would not support such a move by the government. Only 11% favor a second wave of forced mobilization.

8. More than half of Russians (54%) do not perceive a threat from NATO, that its members could attack Russia. 36% of Russians perceive such a threat. Overall, public sentiment in Russia regarding the absence of a threat from NATO has remained unchanged.

9. Most Russians have experienced Telegram blocking to some extent in their daily lives. Telegram's high popularity explains why 67% have a negative attitude toward attempts to block it in Russia. Dissatisfaction with such government actions is noticeable across various social groups, as the blocking disrupts their usual way of life, which has been developing for years.

Research Summary



10. A comparative majority of Russians (45%) stated that if Telegram were completely or significantly blocked, they would switch to the MAX platform and use it. In fact, a similar number of Russians already do so: 42% of respondents said they actively use MAX on a daily basis. Meanwhile, about a third (30%) either don't use it at all or do so rarely.

11. More than half (55%) of Russians have a negative attitude toward the introduction of "whitelists" for mobile internet, which imply access to a limited number of internet resources. Only half as many respondents view such restrictions favorably.

Since Russians generally do not support the introduction of "whitelists" for mobile internet, it's understandable that the majority also do not support similar restrictions for home and fixed internet.




MEDIA CONSUMPTION


СТАТЬЯ 19
... перед законом и судом.
... гарантирует равен-
... прав и свобод человека и граж-
... данина независимо от пола, расы,
... национальности, языка, происхож-
... дения, имущественного положени-
... ного положения, места жительства,
... отношения к религии, убеждений,
... принадлежности к общественным
... объединениям, а также от служеб-
... ных обязанностей, происхождения,
... формы собственности, пола, любви,
... признака пола, языка, расовой,
... национальной принадлежности или рели-
... гиозных убеждений.
3. Мужчины и женщины равны перед законом и судом.

НЕ РАБОТАЕТ


Which news and informational messages are you most inclined to trust? – May 2026, %




If you tend to trust the Internet, which specific sources do you trust? – May 2026, % *Respondents could select more than one answer



Did Russians experience Telegram restrictions in their daily lives? – May 2026, %




What is your attitude toward attempts to block Telegram in Russia? – May 2026, %




What would you do if Telegram were fully or significantly blocked in Russia?


– May 2026, %




How actively do you use the MAX messenger? – May 2026, %



What is your attitude toward the introduction of “white lists” for mobile internet in your region? – May 2026, %



What is your attitude toward the introduction of “white lists” for home/fixed internet in your region? – May 2026, %






MOST ACTUAL PROBLEMS


What are the most pressing problems in the Russian Federation today? – Dynamics of attitudes, %.

** Respondents could select more than one answer*




What are the most pressing problems in the Russian Federation today? – Dynamics of attitudes, %.

** Respondents could select more than one answer*




What should the development priorities of the President of the Russian Federation be in ...? – Dynamics of attitudes, %.

**Respondents could select more than one answer*




What should the development priorities of the President of the Russian Federation be in ...? – Dynamics of attitudes, %.


**Respondents could select more than one answer*




Have you personally noticed inflation in your everyday purchases? – Dynamics of attitudes, %



How have your purchasing opportunities for goods and services changed over the past 6 months? – Dynamics of attitudes, %




How do you think your ability to purchase goods and services will change in 2026? – Dynamics of attitudes, %






DYNAMICS OF THE "SMO" PERCEPTION


In your opinion, is it necessary to conduct another wave of partial mobilization? – Dynamics of attitudes, %




How do you think, what should be the ultimate timeframes for the SMO in Ukraine? – Dynamics of attitudes, %




In your opinion, has the SMO in Ukraine achieved its objectives? – Dynamics of attitudes, %



How would you feel if the SMO in Ukraine ended tomorrow? – Dynamics of attitudes, %



Who, in your opinion, is primarily opposing the Russian Federation during the Special Military Operation in Ukraine? – Dynamics of Public Opinion, %





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
DYNAMICS OF THE "SMO" EXPERIENCE

Do you have among your close relatives or acquaintances anyone who has been mobilized since the start of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine (since February 2022)? – Dynamics of attitudes, %.

**Respondents could select more than one answer*




■ May 2026 ■ January 2025 ■ February 2024 ■ December 2022




Do you have among your close relatives or acquaintances anyone who has been mobilized since the start of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine (since February 2022)? – Dynamics of attitudes, %.

**Respondents could select more than one answer*




Do you have among your close relatives or acquaintances those who have died during the Special Military Operation in Ukraine (since February 2022)? – Dynamics of attitudes, %.

**Respondents could select more than one answer*



Do you have among your close relatives or acquaintances those who have died during the Special Military Operation in Ukraine (since February 2022)? – Dynamics of attitudes, %.


**Respondents could select more than one answer*



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NAVY 

PERCEPTION OF THREAT FROM NATO

Do you perceive a threat from NATO countries that they may attack the Russian Federation? – Dynamics of attitudes, %





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