2025 ROMANIA ELECTIONS: Express Analysis of Russian Interference

2025 ROMANIA ELECTIONS: Express Analysis of Russian Interference

The result of the presidential elections in Romania has strengthened the security of Romania itself, Moldova, Ukraine, and the entire EU. However, it is worth highlighting the main narratives used by Russian propaganda and its proxies to influence the electoral process. These lessons are important for countering future attempts by the Kremlin to interfere in elections in European countries and bring to power those politicians and political forces that could be used to first undermine European solidarity and then – security.

This express analysis is dedicated to identifying key narratives used or amplified by Russian propaganda in April-May 2025 during its attempts to influence the results of the first and second rounds of the presidential elections in Romania.

Data is collected from the Romanian and Russian social media and news, using AI-powered tools and manual sampling.

Key Findings

During the first round of the presidential elections in Romania, Russian propaganda actively used Telegram to promote and support its narratives. The strategic narrative was to present the Romanian elite as part of the pan-European elite that has usurped power and does not respond to the needs of its voters. Overall, the narrative that Brussels dictates foreign policy to independent states, which includes Romania, was one of the closely related narratives criticizing the current Romanian government and mainstream candidates.

During the second round of elections, Russian propaganda also actively used Telegram and continued to promote the strategic narrative about the usurpation of power by European elites and their detachment from voters. At the same time, narratives about attempts by “old Europe” to interfere in the elections in Romania and violate the principles of democracy began to be promoted more frequently. Narratives about the violation or restriction of the right to freedom of speech and manipulation of social networks were used as evidence.

Romania’s exclusion from the US visa-free program was presented on X and Facebook as a response to the Romanian authorities’ actions to violate democratic procedures. During the first round, George Simion said that the previous visa regime could be restored once Romania returned to democracy, referring to his victory in the elections.

In the second round, the narrative of the usurpation of power by European elites and their detachment from their voters was actively promoted on the X and Facebook platforms. On these platforms, as well as on Telegram, the narrative of European countries’ interference in the electoral process in Romania was actively disseminated. The narrative of Moldova’s interference and Maia Sandu’s personal interference was promoted separately.

TikTok has traditionally been used in Romania to advance narratives and boost the chances of individual candidates. George Simion was promoted on the platform during both rounds of the presidential election as the true voice of Romanian voters and as part of a broader European struggle to return to democratic principles. TikTok also promoted a narrative about the need to end Romania’s limited sovereignty and the need to solve its economic problems, which the current establishment is unable to do.

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