By suspending the toughest economic restrictions indefinitely without securing any commitments from Moscow in return, Washington weakens its economic leverage over the Kremlin, giving Russia more room to test Europe’s security on its eastern and southern flanks.
For Moscow, the decision creates an opportunity to preserve its economic resources while testing how far it can go against European states without facing a coordinated Western response. Russia’s open threats in the Baltic region and continued pressure on Black Sea maritime logistics follow the same logic. The Kremlin is using Washington’s hesitation to expand intelligence activities and sabotage operations against Western allies.
U.S. Suspension of Secondary Tariffs Gives Russia More Resources to Sustain the War
The White House’s decision to suspend restrictions under the Graham Act removed one of the main threats to Russian oil exports. The proposed 100% tariffs on imports from countries that continue to buy Russian energy posed a direct threat to Russia’s oil sales to India and China. By setting aside this measure to curb domestic fuel prices ahead of the U.S. elections, Washington put short-term domestic political interests ahead of economic pressure on Russia. For the Kremlin, this decision helps preserve a vital source of foreign currency revenue as Russia continues its winter campaign of strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.
Moscow therefore retains both the revenue needed to sustain the war and an opportunity to use U.S. concessions to preserve the current balance of power. Instead of encouraging Russia to reduce hostilities, Washington is easing the economic pressure intended to raise the cost of prolonging the war. At the same time, a general license for diesel fuel supplies opens the way for Russian suppliers to resume commercial ties with American importers. These ties could create domestic business interests in the United States that favor continued access to Russian energy and oppose the reintroduction of sanctions. As a result, a temporary concession could limit Washington’s freedom of action in the longer term while providing Moscow with additional revenue and greater room to pursue its geopolitical goals.
Russia Uses Threats to Limit Europe’s Response
Russia’s pressure on Europe relies on asymmetric methods. Moscow seeks to deter neighboring states from responding firmly by raising the perceived risk of escalation. European governments must then weigh the possibility of further Russian action against the need to protect infrastructure, strengthen defenses, and coordinate a joint response. Russia, in turn, retains room to test the limits of what its neighbors are prepared to withstand.
The rhetoric surrounding the Kaliningrad region illustrates this approach. On October 16, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova threatened a “crushing” response to any aggression against the exclave, appealing to alleged Polish plans to strike Russian military assets. Although the Russian Foreign Ministry provided no source, the detailed allegations resembled a military assessment.
This approach helps Moscow justify possible escalation in advance. By portraying hypothetical attacks by neighboring states as a real threat, Russia can frame its own actions as a response to Western aggression and present NATO’s defensive measures as preparations for an offence. The Kremlin used similar claims before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, alleging that Ukraine was preparing to attack Donbas. In the case of Kaliningrad, the aim is to constrain decision-making in Poland and the Baltic states before a crisis even begins.
The underlying mechanism is straightforward: Russia seeks to raise the political and security costs of any response to its actions. If the allied governments expect Moscow to use a defensive measure as grounds for further escalation, it has an additional reason to act cautiously. Russia does not need to stop neighboring states from rearming or strengthening their borders. It can achieve its objective by making the use of their existing defensive capabilities politically risky, while complicating decision-making during a crisis.
This approach is particularly useful during incidents that require a rapid response but leave key facts uncertain. Airspace violations, drone incursions near critical infrastructure, and acts of sabotage all create pressure for an immediate decision. Russian threats increase the perceived cost of a miscalculation. This gives Moscow an advantage without requiring an overt military deployment, while uncertainty over the incident’s origin, Russia’s next steps, and the appropriate response makes it harder for European states to act.
Gaps in Deterrence Leave Commercial Shipping Vulnerable off Bulgaria
A series of drone strikes against merchant vessels in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone points to growing pressure on alternative maritime routes serving Danube logistics. As direct blockades of Ukraine’s deep-sea ports have become more difficult, Russia increasingly threatens shipping routes along the coastlines of NATO member states. The resulting risks can undermine export viability by raising freight rates and war-risk insurance premiums and increasing the danger to crews.
Russia continues to test the limits of its actions in the Black Sea by gauging coastal states’ responses. NATO and the EU can strengthen surveillance, intelligence-sharing, and maritime patrols, but these measures alone cannot guarantee the safe passage of commercial vessels. Naval convoys or sustained armed escorts would require common rules for the use of force, a clear division of responsibilities, and allies’ willingness to accept the risk of direct confrontation with Moscow. Russia’s approach relies on keeping the perceived threat high enough to force European states to spend more on protecting maritime routes, while making commercial shipping more expensive and less predictable.
The main risk for Europe lies in the cumulative effect of repeated, localized pressure. Individual incidents may fall short of the threshold for a collective military response, but their recurrence increases the defense costs and limits the options available to European governments. Over time, this can make Russian coercion a persistent feature of the regional security environment. Without coordinated measures to counter these actions, Moscow will continue to exploit divisions among European states and their reluctance to risk escalation, allowing Russia to shape the course of a crisis on its own terms.
