Monitoring Russian narratives regarding Moldova: 5-11.05.2025

The Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia, together with Watchdog MD, conducted weekly monitoring of Russian propaganda attempts to interfere in the electoral process in Moldova and its attempts to influence the domestic political situation in this country. The reporting period covers both the use of the May 9 holiday by Russian propaganda and the results of the first round of the presidential elections in Romania. This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union and Equal Rights & Independent Media (ERIM). Its contents are the sole responsibility of IKAR-WatchDog.MD and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EU and ERIM.

The weekly monitoring report aims to study social media to identify key propaganda narratives, trending topics, active propagandists, and audience engagement statistics related to Moldova's political landscape. The data is collected from the Russian segment of Telegram using AI-powered tools and manual sampling.

Key findings for the period from 5 to 11 May 2025:

1. In the context of May 9 – a day that, in the Republic of Moldova, symbolizes the commemoration of the victims of the Second World War – Russian propaganda efforts have focused on criticizing the authorities in Chișinău for allegedly trying to erase the historical memory of Moldovans. Russian propaganda fails to make a clear distinction between the celebration of Victory Day and the commemoration of the war’s victims, which helps perpetuate the narratives that “Moldova neglects the memory of the Great Patriotic War (World War II)” and “Moldova and Russia share a common history.” Also in the context of May 9, Russian propaganda placed emphasis on historical themes and, for the second week in a row, promoted the narrative “Nazism is glorified in Moldova.” This narrative is used by Russia to justify its hostile actions toward other states, including Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.

2. The contradictory narrative surrounding George Simion’s profile – portrayed simultaneously as a unionist and a Moscow agent – highlights a disinformation strategy aimed at discrediting unionist discourse and fueling confusion in the public space.

3. Russian propaganda continues to promote both the leaders of parties affiliated with Ilan Șor and Igor Dodon, as well as one of the leaders of the Alternativa Bloc, Ion Ceban, who positions himself as “pro-European.” During the reference period, Russian propaganda endorsed pro-Russian politicians in Moldova depending on the topic: Victoria Furtună addressed the issue of justice, Șor and Dodon focused on traditional values and ties with Russia, while Ion Ceban framed the government as being aligned with LGBT propaganda.

With May 9 behind us, Russian disinformation on historical topics will take a backseat, and other themes will be exploited, particularly those related to the upcoming autumn parliamentary elections, the June LGBT march, and European integration.

For a detailed report, see the presentation.