Analytical Report "RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN ELECTORAL PROCESSES: RISKS FOR UKRAINE"

Russia uses common and proven approaches in its attempts to influence electoral processes in other countries. Significant efforts are directed at Russian-speaking voters in these countries and at presenting the elections there to their own citizens in the light necessary for internal political stability within the Russian Federation itself.

Our research aims to analyze the main approaches of Russian information influence directed against state institutions and democratic values in post-Soviet countries, through the application of advanced media monitoring and analysis methods.

Based on this research, we can outline 13 main risks or 13 “gray rhinos” regarding a hypothetical election in Ukraine. These “gray rhinos” are identified based on lessons learned from our analysis of the election campaigns in Moldova and Georgia, as well as our own experience of the political processes in Ukraine since 2014 and attempts by Russia to influence them. Of course, there will be more once the elections are actually announced.

Given the lessons learned from Russia’s interference in the 2024 elections in Moldova and Georgia, we can talk about the most likely approaches to interfering in the Ukrainian elections, once they are announced:

1. PROMOTING EUROSCEPTICISM IN UKRAINE

For obvious reasons, during the election campaign, none of the Ukrainian politicians will directly express narratives about the need for close ties with Russia. Instead, all the efforts of Russian propaganda and operations of influence from the very beginning of the election campaign will be aimed at promoting EUROSCEPTICISM as a strategic narrative.

2. ULTRA-NATIONALIST, XENOPHOBIC, ANTI-LIBERAL AGENDA

This allows demonstrating to Ukrainian citizens that the so-called “European values” have unacceptable components. Along with spreading Euroscepticism among Ukrainians, this allows for the spread of “Ukrainian skepticism” among European officials and decision-makers. It will also facilitate an operation of influence within EU countries to discredit Ukraine among local politicians and societies.

3. MANIPULATION OF THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION

The issue of corruption is very resonant in Ukrainian society and is often used to describe many aspects of public life in the country. It provokes active discussions even during the war.

4. DISCREDITATION OF TOP OFFICIALS TO DEPRECIATE THE RESISTANCE

The main goal of these efforts will be not only to discredit a specific figure, but also to desacralize the heroic resistance of Ukrainian citizens during the invasion and their struggle during the hot phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war. On the other hand, to shift the blame for waging an aggressive war with the Russian Federation onto the military-political leadership of Ukraine, which caused such actions by Russia.

5. DIVIDING OF SOCIETY ON THE ISSUE OF PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR

After the start of the election campaign, the criterion of participation and non-participation in the war will be brought into the public sphere in order to strengthen this split for political purposes, which Russian propaganda will undoubtedly take advantage of.

6. MANIPULATION OF LANGUAGE ISSUES

The issue of the Russian language has been one of the central ones in Russia’s attempts to influence Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy for three decades after the collapse of the USSR. Russian propaganda will undoubtedly actively use this tool during a hypothetical election campaign in Ukraine. It is important to emphasize that Russian propaganda did not stop doing this even during the war.

7. DIVIDING OF SOCIETY ON THE CHURCH ISSUE

The Russian propaganda is trying to replace the church issue itself with a religious issue, talking about the oppression of the Orthodox by the Ukrainian authorities. It is obvious that the issue of the functioning of the UOC (MP) will be an important tool for Russian propaganda interference in hypothetical Ukrainian elections and a kind of marker for participants in the political process.

8. SPECULATION REGARDING OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Manipulating the topic of occupied territories is a universal tool of Russian propaganda, which it has used and is using in Moldova and Georgia. We also observed the active involvement of this topic during 2014-2022 in Ukraine; now, Russia continues to use it in its operations of influence.

9. THREAT OF A NEW FULL-SCALE INVASION

The threat of a new full-scale attack is highly likely to be used by Russia during the election campaign in Ukraine. This risk is even more significant for a hypothetical election in Ukraine compared to the described Russian propaganda approaches used during the elections in Georgia and Moldova, since the memory of the Great War will be fresh and the fear of its repetition will be even more acute. Especially after a short period of relative calm and attempts by Ukrainian citizens to establish a peaceful life.

10. BLURRING RESPONSIBILITY

This tool has great potential for Russian propaganda, as it will also be aimed at denying the Russian Federation's attempts to destroy the Ukrainian nation as such through an aggressive war and shifting its causes to certain disagreements between abstract politicians. While cultural, scientific, civil society, and religious figures on both sides will demonstrate understanding of the need for dialogue that will put the entire list of Russian war crimes against Ukraine out of brackets.

11. ESTABLISHING UNOFFICIAL POLITICAL TIES

One can expect attempts to establish close ties with far-right and far-left parties against the backdrop of criticism of liberal values and the spread of Euroscepticism.

12. VOTER BRIBERY BY ORGANIZED NETWORKS

After the cessation of hostilities and the announcement of hypothetical elections, Russia will not have as much time to establish a network of bribery in Ukraine. However, it can be expected that the Kremlin will try to target individual political actors or political parties in Ukraine.

13. CREATION OF A COORDINATED NETWORK OF CHANNELS ON VARIOUS PLATFORMS

With the loss of importance of traditional media, primarily TV channels, Russian propaganda will use YouTube channels, and for the rapid dissemination of certain narratives, Telegram, TikTok, and Instagram platforms. Therefore, during a hypothetical election campaign in Ukraine, one should expect active disinformation measures and influence operations from the Russian side on these platforms.

For a detailed report, see the presentation.