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    Monitoring Russian Narratives Regarding Moldova: 26.05-1.06.2025

    04/06/2025, 15:00

    The Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia, together with Watchdog MD, conducted a weekly monitoring of Russian propaganda attempts to interfere in the electoral process in Moldova and its attempts to influence the domestic political situation in this country. This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union and Equal Rights & Independent Media (ERIM). Its contents are the sole responsibility of IKAR-WatchDog.MD and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EU and ERIM.

    The weekly monitoring report aims to study social media to identify key propaganda narratives, trending topics, active propagandists, and audience engagement statistics related to Moldova's political landscape. The data is collected from the Russian segment of Telegram using AI-powered tools and manual sampling.

    Key findings for May 26–June 1, 2025:

    1. The disinformation promoted by the Russian Federation is aimed at undermining the trust of Moldovan citizens in Western partners and keeping the country within its sphere of influence. By manipulating information and promoting anti-NATO narratives, Russia is trying to prevent NATO enlargement in former Soviet countries, including the Republic of Moldova.

    2. Russian propaganda continues its disinformation campaign aimed at fueling the narrative of a false aggression by the Republic of Moldova against the Transnistrian region. In conclusion, the Russian propaganda's repetition of the Tiraspol leader's old messages underlines both the exhaustion of the Kremlin's current narrative resources and a possible reluctance of the Transnistrian authorities to get directly involved in the provocations orchestrated by Moscow on the left bank of the Dniester.

    3. Propagandistic messages about changes in the Kremlin's structure of influence and alleged tensions between Russian officials seem to be mainly aimed at the domestic audience, with the aim of strengthening the image of Sergei Kirienko as an influential figure in Russian foreign policy, including in relation to Moldova. At the same time, through such messages, Russian propaganda recognizes Russian involvement in the internal affairs of other states.

    4. The Russian Federation's interest in the polls in the Republic of Moldova shows that it is counting on a coalition formed by the Alternative Bloc, Our Party, Party of Socialists, and Victory Bloc after the parliamentary elections on September 28. This can also be seen in Igor Dodon's speech, which suggests that the new government, without PAS, will have to urgently discuss social and economic issues with Moscow.

    5. A sovereignist bloc is forming around Victoria Furtune, supported by Ilan Shor, following the Romanian model. Furtuna's role is to promote the already entrenched narrative that Moldova should take Bugevac, part of the Odessa region, from Ukraine. At the same time, through the “Eurasia” organization, Russia continues to promote Ilan Shor as a philanthropist in the CIS.

    For a detailed report, see the presentation.