Monitoring Russian Narratives Regarding Moldova: 2-8.06.2025

The Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia, together with Watchdog MD, conducted another weekly monitoring of Russian propaganda attempts to interfere in the electoral process in Moldova and its attempts to influence the domestic political situation in this country. This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union and Equal Rights & Independent Media (ERIM). Its contents are the sole responsibility of IKAR-WatchDog.MD and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EU and ERIM.

The weekly monitoring report aims to study social media to identify key propaganda narratives, trending topics, active propagandists, and audience engagement statistics related to Moldova's political landscape. The data is collected from the Russian segment of Telegram using AI-powered tools and manual sampling.

Key findings for June 2-8, 2025:

  1. The death of the Moldovan composer Eugen Doga was used by Russian propaganda to fuel the narrative of Soviet nostalgia and to substantiate the idea that everything the Republic of Moldova has, including in the cultural sphere, is due to the USSR. This is a classic example of the use of misinformation narratives related to history depending on events in Chisinau.

  2. As predicted earlier, the Transnistria issue is being further exploited with the aim of planning a destabilization in the region that could influence the outcome of the parliamentary elections on 28 September. At the same time, the tense situation in Transnistria keeps Ukraine on the alert for possible provocations prepared by Russia on the left bank of the Dniester.

  3. Russian propaganda returns to the subject of Moldova's energy supply. In this respect, Maria Zaharova's statements reflect an attempt to misinform, distorting the legitimate measures taken by the Government of the Republic of Moldova to ensure its energy independence and to manage its resources in the interests of a sovereign state.

  4. We are still following the promotion of the same Moldovan politicians by Russian propaganda. As the sentencing date in the case of Evghenia Gutul is approaching, Russian propaganda is intensifying the narrative that a possible conviction of the Bashkan would, in reality, be pressure on Gagauzia.

  5. Igor Dodon's messages are being increasingly taken up as they coincide with the themes used by Russian propaganda to antagonize Moldovan society on the following topics: neutrality, NATO membership, the energy crisis, etc. At the same time, Igor Dodon is being promoted more intensively due to the ongoing negotiations on the formation of an electoral bloc, which is expected to be headed by the PSRM.

  6. The propagandistic messages in the context of PRIDE month have the effect of enhancing the image of politicians such as Ion Ceban or Ilan Shor in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections. Thus, in the case of Ion Ceban and the Bloc Alternativa, an attempt is being made to create the image of a "pro-European conservative" political force fighting against "LGBT propaganda," as opposed to the ruling PAS party, which allegedly supports this community.

For a detailed report, see the presentation.