Monitoring Russian Narratives Regarding Moldova: 9-15.06.2025

The Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia, together with Watchdog MD, conducted another weekly monitoring of Russian propaganda attempts to interfere in the electoral process in Moldova and its attempts to influence the domestic political situation in this country. This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union and Equal Rights & Independent Media (ERIM). Its contents are the sole responsibility of IKAR-WatchDog.MD and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EU and ERIM.

The weekly monitoring report aims to study social media to identify key propaganda narratives, trending topics, active propagandists, and audience engagement statistics related to Moldova's political landscape. The data is collected from the Russian segment of Telegram using AI-powered tools and manual sampling.

Key findings for June 9-15, 2025:

1. The march organized by the LGBT Community was heavily publicized by Russian propaganda to antagonize society and highlight so-called leaders defending traditional values. One of the leaders of the Alternativa Bloc, Ion Ceban, although positioning himself as pro-European, promoted an order limiting citizens' rights to public assembly, which contravenes European norms.

2. The Alternativa Bloc is increasingly present in Russian media. It was positively highlighted by Russian propaganda for the protests organized on June 9 in front of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) against the politicization of the institution. At the same time, one of the leaders of the Alternativa Bloc, Ion Ceban, is portrayed as a fighter against LGBT values "promoted" by the government. Similarly, Russian media promotes false narratives that the Moldovan Government is fighting Orthodoxy because it does not allow the organization of the "Way of the Cross" march.

3. In general, Russian propaganda maximized the coverage of protests organized by Alternativa at the CEC, by PSRM at the National Agency for Energy Regulation, by Irina Vlah’s party at the Audiovisual Council, and also the protests in Gagauzia supporting Evghenia Gutsul. Such coordination and coverage suggest that the protests were intentionally organized to mimic "mass dissatisfaction" with the PAS government.

4. The revival of Ilan Shor’s accusations against Igor Dodon and their intense promotion in Russian media indicate an intensification of disagreements between the two pro-Russian leaders. Moreover, Igor Dodon's party is practically forced to merge into a bloc with formations affiliated with Ilan Shor, which is not to Dodon’s liking. Thus, Shor tries to blackmail or at least discredit the former head of state to present him in a weaker position before Kremlin curators.

5. Russian propaganda tries to distance Vasile Tarlev, leader of the Future of Moldova Party, from the Shor group. Tarlev is portrayed positively because he sued the president of the WatchDog.MD Community, Valeriu Pașa. The former prime minister accuses Pasha of slander and claims to have no connection with Ilan Shor, although an investigation by Ziarului de Gardă showed otherwise. Attempts to discredit Moldovan civil society are not new and are part of the Kremlin’s toolkit to influence public opinion in Moldova.

6. The Russian Federation continues to promote narratives regarding Western interference in Moldova’s internal affairs, especially in the context of the September 28 elections. These messages aim to divide society and fuel social tensions, which Moscow could exploit to encourage protests or other destabilizing actions before or after the elections.

For a detailed report, see the presentation.