Evolution of the number and content of messages, as well as reactions to them during the initial period of the “Kursk operation” shows the extensive efforts of Russian propaganda to downplay the significance of these events for Russian society and concerted efforts to push the facts of the invasion out of public discussion.
This is evidenced by the results of a comprehensive media analysis of Russian social networks conducted by the Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia (IKAR). The analysis used keywords and phrases defining the context of Kursk events, as well as related topics and publications in Telegram communities for the period from August 6 to August 24, 2024. Additionally, publications by individual servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces, whose data were verified through OSINT tools, were also analysed.
The peak of Russians’ reactions to the events in the Kursk region was on August 8 (with more than 600,000 mentions). However, the volume of reactions decreased to almost 80,000 by August 14 and 18,000 as of August 24.
Based on the analysis of posts of users from the Kursk region during the Ukrainian “Kursk operation” (August 6–24, 2024), the information space revealed a trend of panic among residents of front-line cities and nearby areas. A wave of dissatisfaction quickly spread among Russians due to the surprise effect of the Ukrainian attack. This frustration was compounded by the absence of official statements from the Russian leadership and the rapid flood of user-generated photos and posts, which showcased the swift advance of Ukrainian forces deep into Russian territory.
As the operation progressed and more propaganda materials were introduced, the initial panic among Kursk region residents began to shift. Criticism of the authorities gave way to support for the Russian Armed Forces and the incitement of international hostility. However, direct witnesses of the armed conflict, particularly residents of captured settlements like Sudzha, continued to post photos and videos from the combat zone. The Kremlin responded to this by implementing strict censorship, systematically removing such content from Telegram communities.
Publications about the mass surrender of Russian conscripts and Russian losses in this theatre of war were closely monitored by Kremlin control bodies and subjected to harsh criticism, as indicated by numerous surrogate accounts (bots) later deleted.
One of the main complaints from Kursk region residents was the lack of organized evacuation measures for the civilian population and the inadequate response from local authorities. Between August 6 and 24, more than 600,000 reactions were recorded, with 20% expressing a negative view of the evacuation efforts and less than 3% showing a positive response.
According to AI-powered analysis, out of nearly 4,000 sources providing information during this period on the evacuation from the Kursk region, over 600 were compromised communication channels (including communities, groups, and users) that systematically disseminated Kremlin propaganda and fake news. The number of bots involved in this information campaign exceeded 800. These bots were used to promote pro-Kremlin narratives, with their behaviour clearly indicating their inauthenticity.
Most messages in z-channels during the beginning of Kursk operation carried a negative tone. Russian military bloggers criticized both the command and political leadership for the lack of a clear action plan and the failure to defend the Kursk region, resulting in significant territorial and personnel losses.
Russian part took extensive measures to prevent the dissemination of information about the killed in action and missed in action. For example, a group called “Sudzha – Search for People,” which published the names and phone numbers of missing Russians, including military personnel in the Kursk region, was blocked on the VKontakte social network. Access to the group was restricted exclusively to Russian IP addresses.
The Kremlin actively exploits the Telegram platform and other similar resources while preventing the spread of undesirable posts and comments. Therefore, most such publications exist in the public space only until the first audit, after which they are immediately deleted.
