Russia runs planned information campaigns to influence political choices, public moods, and decision-making in Western democracies. The goal of these campaigns is to plant self-interested stories into the local politics of these countries. By using existing social problems, a lack of trust in leaders, and conflicts of interest, Moscow interferes in the information space of European nations. It makes divisions deeper and weakens trust in democratic institutions.
Russian influence operations in Europe rely on a network of Russian state media, local media, politicians, and ideological allies. These groups help adapt and spread the messages Russia wants. Such networks do not always act as one central formation. Instead, their influence happens through formal links, casual teamwork, or by spreading the same narratives across different participants.
Despite differences in how they are organized, their ties with Russia, and how many people they reach, these groups share the same basic message about the war in Ukraine. They aim to disgrace the Ukrainian government, reduce support for Ukraine, and create political conditions that force an end to the war on Russia’s terms.
Making Ukraine Look Bad and Pushing Russian Peace Terms
One main goal is to attack the reputation of Ukraine’s leaders by spreading the idea that they are not legitimate and cannot run the country well. Russian terms like “illegitimate president,” “Kyiv regime,” and “junta” appear in the media of various countries. Local outlets then add their own arguments to fit local political debates.
For example, in September 2026, the German publication Junge Welt described Ukraine as a “failed state” and treated corruption as a standalone problem, ignoring how the war damages state institutions. The Czech outlet CZ24.NEWS focused on internal instability, claiming there was a plot by elites against the president and persecution of critics. Meanwhile, the Slovak outlet Hlavné správy connected the lack of elections during martial law to claims that Ukraine’s leaders are just trying to get rich.
These messages turn the general idea of an illegitimate government into specific local concerns. As a result, talks about corruption, elections, and political squabbles become tools to attack Ukrainian institutions. This allows Russian ideas to spread through local topics and media without simply repeating official Kremlin speeches.
Using Corruption as an Argument Against Supporting Ukraine
At the same time, Russian information narratives use real corruption investigations in Ukraine to cast doubt on the integrity of its leaders and the point of giving more international help. Single cases are presented as proof that the state always fails, and financial help from partners is painted as money that Ukrainian leaders use for themselves.
The German outlet Junge Welt, mentioned above, claimed that Ukraine’s request to extradite a suspect from Israel (in an anti-corruption case) was just a trick to secure another tranche of funds from the EU. In French-language media, this idea becomes even simpler: “Europe is an ATM for Ukraine.”
Both approaches shift attention away from the real details of investigations and how aid is monitored, turning it into a general claim that financial help is useless. This way, anti-corruption topics become a tool to create distrust toward Ukraine and put political pressure on European governments that decide on future aid.
Portraying Ukraine as a Threat
In some European media, the criticism of Ukraine goes beyond its government and policy. It starts to paint regular Ukrainians as a threat to public safety and stability in Europe. To do this, single crimes and statistics are used to make broad claims about all Ukrainians.
The Polish publication Myśl Polska used police stats about 2,000 detained people (including 169 foreigners, mostly Ukrainians) to push the idea that “the Ukrainian mafia is already here.” This image gets stronger with claims that after the war ends, “Bandera followers will march West.” Also, joint military training exercises by the “coalition of the willing” in Poland are described as creating a “training ground for Bandera followers.”
In the Czech outlet CZ24.NEWS (and Parlamentní listy), similar ideas apply to foreign policy. One interview calls support for Ukraine a “deal with the devil” that supposedly “normalizes helping Nazism and genocide.” Despite different topics, these messages create a shared picture of Ukraine as a source of criminal, security, and moral risks for Europe. This shifts attention away from Russian aggression and onto an imaginary threat to European citizens.
Pushing Surrender as the Only Way to End the War
This group of messages uses real statements and events to push the idea that Ukraine cannot win and that there are no alternatives to Russian peace terms. The German Junge Welt called an interview with the Ukrainian president on Canadian TV a “step toward surrender.” Meanwhile, the Czech Parlamentní listy claimed that Ukraine “has practically become a landlocked state” and therefore lost its economic appeal for foreign partners.
In another article by the same outlet, a political analyst predicted that after the “surrender of Kyiv,” current EU leaders will lose power. These claims mix views on Ukraine’s military future with predictions of economic ruin and political trouble for Europe. This narrows the room for talking about other ways the war could end. It presents continuing the fight as a waste of resources, while giving in to Russia is shown as an unavoidable and practical choice.
Militarization as a Threat to Europe’s Wealth and Safety
Another group of messages shifts attention away from Russia’s war and onto the costs and risks for Europe. It presents defense policy as a source of economic trouble and a risk of direct clash with Russia.
The Italian outlet L’AntiDiplomatico described the shift in EU budgets toward defense as moving “from a social economy to a war economy” and predicted it will “inevitably lead Europe to collapse.” The outlet also claimed that “European elites demand escalation all the way to nuclear war.” It mixed this with a statement from the Italian defense minister that most citizens oppose helping Ukraine. In German-speaking media, the focus shifts to the risk of a direct war caused by sending Taurus missiles to Ukraine.
Despite different points of emphasis, these messages build a shared cause-and-effect link: military help for Ukraine supposedly leads to cuts in social programs, economic decline, and out-of-control escalation. In this view, talking about how much help to give is replaced by the claim that the price is too high for European societies. This builds an argument for cutting back on defense measures.
Anti-American Rhetoric Aimed at Stopping Aid to Ukraine
In their pieces, pro-Russian outlets criticize U.S. policy, using selected statements from American leaders to help argue for stopping aid to Ukraine. For example, the same Italian outlet L’AntiDiplomatico claimed that Washington is purposely “deindustrializing Europe,” presenting relations across the Atlantic as an economic loss for Europeans.
L’AntiDiplomatico used statements from the U.S. president criticizing Ukraine’s leadership to back up arguments for surrender. Similar calls appear in the Czech outlet CZ24.NEWS and the Slovak Hlavné správy.
At first glance, these messages rely on different and sometimes conflicting views of Washington’s role. Yet they share the same job: whether the U.S. is shown as a force weakening Europe or as a voice pushing for concessions from Ukraine, they frame the U.S. position as an argument to cut support for Kyiv.
Together, all these stories form a linked model. Corruption charges question the help, fear of threats builds panic, and criticizing Western governments shifts the blame for a long war onto Ukraine’s partners. At the same time, claims that surrender is certain and militarization is dangerous narrow down the options for good political choices.
In the end, stopping support for Ukraine is presented as a practical answer to economic, security, and political risks. Meanwhile, giving in to Russian demands is separated from the question of Moscow’s responsibility for the war. This trick with cause and effect lets different messages—tailored to local audiences—point to one shared conclusion: stop supporting Ukraine and force it to surrender.
How Russian Stories Fit into National Debates
Russian messages spread in European countries through media and politicians who adapt them to local politics and society. Differences between countries depend on what topics these groups focus on and who they talk to.
In Poland, Myśl Polska links Ukraine to threats against national security, crime, and the spread of Bandera’s ideology. The outlet uses historical fights over the Volhynian tragedy, demanding the “de-Banderization” of Ukraine and limits on its military power. Similar views appear in the rhetoric of the Konfederacja Korony Polskiej party led by Grzegorz Braun, which opposes military aid to Ukraine and the “Ukrainianization of Poland.”
Sahra Wagenknecht—former leader of the Left party group in the Bundestag and leader of BSW—used the topic of military help for Ukraine to rally populist voters. She blamed Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his circle for allegedly stealing Western help, contrasting the cost of arming Ukraine with funding for pensions and social programs in Germany. This argument tied support for Ukraine to the risk of losing money and distrusting Ukrainian leaders, increasing competition between foreign policy duties and local social needs. Even though regional polls showed BSW support below 5%, the demand to stop sending weapons to Ukraine was present in the national political debate.
Czech and Slovak outlets like CZ24.NEWS, Hlavné správy, and Zem a Vek form a shared media space that repeats official Russian points and terms, such as the abbreviation “SMO” (Special Military Operation). Using materials from the Russian Defense Ministry, EADaily, and pro-Russian Telegram channels, these outlets push the idea that Ukraine’s leaders are not legitimate, calling President Zelenskyy “illegitimate” and the government in Ukraine a “regime.”
In Bulgaria, Pogled.info regularly translates and publishes Russian media content that is banned by EU sanctions. Russian messages are adapted to the Bulgarian context by using topics like the alleged persecution of the Bulgarian minority in Ukraine, criticism of the European Green Deal, and joining the eurozone. This ties Russia’s stance to local debates about national interests and European integration.
In these countries, Russian stories spread through different political and media circles. While some outlets directly copy Russian sources, others push the points through local debates. As a result, Russian interpretations find local fans and enter national political debates without needing constant orders from the Kremlin.
How European Publications Turn into Moscow’s Arguments
Russian state media use European publications that match the Kremlin’s views as proof that the West supports Russia. The main channel for this is the project Rossiya Segodnya – InoSMI, which translates foreign articles and presents them as independent views by Western authors.
These translated pieces regularly feature a small circle of authors and outlets. Between April and October 2026, the Russian resource InoSMI published at least nine pieces by Reinhard Lauterbach from the German Junge Welt about corruption, the “reburial of Yevhen Konovalets,” surrender, and Ukrainian neutrality. Besides that, interviews with Radim Panenka, Jan Rychetský, and Ivan Hoffman from the Czech Parlamentní listy, as well as articles by Fabrizio Poggi and Marinella Mondaini from the Italian L’AntiDiplomatico, were translated regularly.
The case of the Polish outlet Myśl Polska clearly shows how these pieces are scaled up. In June 2026, a Russian news aggregator translated an article by Tomasz Jankowski about crime among Ukrainians under a provocative headline about an “invasion of Ukrainian bandits.” The main state news agency, RIA Novosti, quickly shared it as news citing a “Polish media outlet.” As a result, a column from a small niche outlet turned into a nationwide news story.
Besides political analysis, Russian resources use personal stories to show that life inside Russia is supposedly normal and stable. In the fall of 2026, they reprinted a Czech interview with a traveler who visited Moscow and Siberia, using a headline that highlighted Russia’s strength against outside pressure. Stories like this fill out the information picture with everyday personal impressions.
This republishing completely changes what European publications mean: local and small views turn into “proof” that Moscow’s position is recognized worldwide.
Russia adjusts fake news and propaganda to fit the political and social problems of each European country. Through local media and politicians, it spreads points that shake trust in Ukraine and convince people to stop military help for Kyiv. Russian state media republish these pieces, presenting them as proof that Europe supports Russia’s position. This deepens divisions between European countries and creates conditions where giving in to Moscow might look like an acceptable way to end the war, despite the security risks for all of Europe.
