Monitoring Russian Narratives Regarding Moldova: 28.04-4.05.2025

Monitoring Russian Narratives Regarding Moldova: 28.04-4.05.2025

The Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia, together with Watchdog MD, finished another weekly monitoring of Russian propaganda attempts to interfere in the electoral process in Moldova and its attempts to influence the domestic political situation in this country. This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union and Equal Rights & Independent Media (ERIM). Its contents are the sole responsibility of IKAR-WatchDog.MD and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EU and ERIM.

The weekly monitoring report aims to study social media to identify key propaganda narratives, trending topics, active propagandists, and audience engagement statistics related to Moldova’s political landscape. The data is collected from the Russian segment of Telegram using AI-powered tools and manual sampling.

Key findings for the period from April 28 to May 4, 2025:

  1. The repeated use of the narrative “Moldova is used to train terrorists”, along with a new disinformation campaign about reigniting the war on the Dniester, shows that Russia is testing the waters ahead of a potential provocation on either the left or right bank of the Dniester. The Kremlin has repeatedly employed this type of aggressive rhetoric since the launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, especially in the context of provocations orchestrated by Russian intelligence services in the Transnistrian region. The main goal has been to discredit the authorities in Chișinău and Kyiv and to create a propagandistic justification for possible destabilization efforts.
  2. Russian propaganda intensified around May 9th, using narratives such as “Nazism is glorified in Moldova” and “Romania wants to control Moldova.” Both narratives are part of a recurring rhetoric used annually to portray Moldova’s government as nazist. The theme of “falsifying history” is used by Russian propaganda precisely to conceal the distortions that Russia itself has produced and disseminated throughout the post-Soviet space.
  3. The promotion of actions and messages from figures like Igor Dodon, Vladimir Voronin, Aleksandr Stoianoglo, and Irina Vlah clearly demonstrates the Russian Federation’s interest in these actors, who may represent Moscow’s key stake in the upcoming parliamentary elections this autumn. The appearance of messages in the Russian information space written by former Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat further indicates that he has become a Kremlin tool in promoting Russia’s agenda both within the Republic of Moldova and abroad.

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