War has once again become the number one concern for Russians, and they would like it to end as soon as possible
The Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia (IKAR) conducted a sociological survey as part of its monitoring of Russian society, called the “Mirror of Russia.” The 10th wave was conducted from May 11 to 26, 2026, using a nationwide sample. The survey methodology was CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interview), a telephone survey by interactive structured questionnaire using special software for sociological surveys. A total of 1,600 respondents were interviewed. The statistical error, with a probability of 0.95, does not exceed 2.5%.
Key survey findings
1. Compared to last year, significant changes were recorded in public sentiment regarding the war and its impact on Russians’ daily lives: Russians once again ranked the “Special Military Operation” as the most pressing issue in the Russian Federation (33%), while low wages and high prices ranked second and third (24% and 18%, respectively). This reverses the trend of recent years, when prices and wages became the primary concerns for Russians, while the war was relegated to third or fourth place. Thus, the war has once again become an important factor in Russians’ daily lives, moving from being a background event to a more important one.
2. In the Russian public consciousness, there is a logical connection between the war and their own financial situation, as research from previous years has documented. Therefore, according to Russians, the president’s top priorities for Russia’s development in 2026 should be a successful conclusion to the war and an improvement in the financial situation of Russians—both options receive 58% of the vote. Moreover, these priorities significantly outpace other alternatives.
3. 94% of Russians have noticed an increase in the prices of goods and services in their everyday purchases. These figures are identical to those obtained in the 2025 study. Moreover, their assessments of their purchasing capabilities over the last six months of this year were worse, and they are even more skeptical about what it will be like by the end of the year: compared to last year’s study, skepticism among Russians increased from 54% to 62%.
4. About half of Russians (47%) believe that Russia has partially or fully achieved its military goals in Ukraine. This is significantly lower than a year ago, when this figure was 54%. However, 46% of Russians would like the war to end no later than six months. This represents a 5% increase compared to last year. Overall, since December 2022, the number of Russians who wanted the war to end as quickly as possible has steadily increased, from 24% to 46% this year.
Meanwhile, the number of Russians who favored a war without a time limit, ending in complete victory, has decreased from 13% to 9%, the lowest level in all four years of the full-scale phase of the war.
5. The change in Russian sentiment is also demonstrated by a follow-up question about support for ending the war tomorrow: an absolute majority of Russians – 81% – would support such a move. This is the highest figure in all four years. Since 2023, it has remained at 72-75%.
6. Among Russians, the proportion who have someone mobilized since the beginning of the full-scale invasion is growing. This study showed a share of 74%. At the same time, the number of respondents who have had someone from their inner circle—family members or friends—serve in the Russian army is growing. Currently, the share of respondents who have mobilized one or more family members is 31%. This compares to 14% in 2022. Correspondingly, the number of Russians who have lost someone in the war is growing: only 29% report that no one among their relatives or friends died in combat. According to the latest data, 21% of Russians had one or more relatives who died during the full-scale phase of the war. In the last year alone, this share increased from 15% to 21%. In December 2022, this share was only 2%. The share of those who have lost a friend is also steadily growing. Currently, this share is 22%, compared to only 6% in December 2022.
7. Russian society remains clearly opposed to a second wave of forced mobilization similar to that of autumn 2022 – approximately three-quarters (73%) of respondents would not support such a move by the government. Only 11% favor a second wave of forced mobilization.
8. More than half of Russians (54%) do not perceive a threat from NATO, that its members could attack Russia. 36% of Russians perceive such a threat. Overall, public sentiment in Russia regarding the absence of a threat from NATO has remained unchanged.
9. Most Russians have experienced Telegram blocking to some extent in their daily lives. Telegram’s high popularity explains why 67% have a negative attitude toward attempts to block it in Russia. Dissatisfaction with such government actions is noticeable across various social groups, as the blocking disrupts their usual way of life, which has been developing for years.
10. A comparative majority of Russians (45%) stated that if Telegram were completely or significantly blocked, they would switch to the MAX platform and use it. In fact, a similar number of Russians already do so: 42% of respondents said they actively use MAX on a daily basis. Meanwhile, about a third (30%) either don’t use it at all or do so rarely.
11. More than half (55%) of Russians have a negative attitude toward the introduction of “whitelists” for mobile internet, which imply access to a limited number of internet resources. Only half as many respondents view such restrictions favorably.
Since Russians generally do not support the introduction of “whitelists” for mobile internet, it’s understandable that the majority also do not support similar restrictions for home and fixed internet.
