Growing support for Alternative for Germany (AfD) gives Russia new opportunities to influence politics in one of the European Union’s most influential member states. The party has its own political agenda, but its positions on sanctions, military aid to Ukraine, energy cooperation, and relations with Moscow align with the Kremlin’s key foreign policy interests. This allows Russian information campaigns to amplify AfD’s messaging without directly coordinating with the party’s leadership.
For Moscow, the goal is not only to promote individual pro-Russian positions but also to change the nature of political debate in Germany. In particular, Russia seeks to shift attention away from its responsibility for the war and toward the economic costs of supporting Ukraine. This approach presents the consequences of Russian aggression as the result of decisions by the German federal government, while portraying the restoration of cooperation with Moscow as a way to protect national economic interests. Russian information networks further amplify these messages by using content from the party and selectively targeting AfD’s political opponents.
AfD’s political activity and Russian information operations create complementary channels of influence. The party uses criticism of the government’s foreign policy to expand its support, while the Kremlin gains an opportunity to promote its preferred demands through domestic political competition in Germany.
AfD Shapes Its Political Agenda Around Moscow’s Interests
AfD’s foreign policy calls for a review of Germany’s relations with its Western partners and the restoration of cooperation with Russia. The party supports restructuring the European Union, reducing the role of supranational institutions, and establishing a multipolar world order. Its 2024 European Parliament election program, for example, proposed developing relations with the Eurasian Economic Union, where Russia plays the leading role.
After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, AfD condemned the aggression but opposed the main forms of support for Ukraine. In a position paper issued by its parliamentary group in March 2022, the party called for an end to hostilities while rejecting arms supplies to Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, and Ukraine’s future membership in NATO and the EU. Instead, it proposed focusing on negotiations and a possible UN or OSCE peacekeeping mission. However, the document did not set out specific conditions that Russia would have to meet to end its aggression.
This position creates an imbalance between the demands placed on Ukraine and those placed on Russia. Ukraine is effectively expected to stop resisting or enter negotiations without any clear arrangements to restore its territorial integrity. At the same time, AfD rejects measures that could limit Russia’s ability to continue the war, including sanctions and military aid to Kyiv. This position benefits Moscow because it weakens international support for Ukraine and reduces the economic costs Russia faces as a result of its aggression.
Energy policy is another area in which the political rhetoric of the “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) most consistently aligns with Russian interests. In June 2022, the energy spokesperson of the party’s parliamentary group called for the launch of Nord Stream 2, arguing that the rejection of Russian energy supplies was harming the German economy. In October of the same year, the parliamentary group proposed repairing, reopening, and protecting the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines. This was presented as a way to reduce prices and stabilize energy supplies.
In the same month, AfD co-chair Alice Weidel described the war as an “economic war against Germany” and called for negotiations with Moscow. She also stated that Germany should not concern itself with Ukraine’s future territorial arrangements.
These statements form a consistent line of argument in which the economic consequences of the war are explained primarily through sanctions and decisions by Western governments. Moscow’s responsibility for the aggression and its use of energy supplies as a tool of political pressure receive much less attention. Within this framework, restoring cooperation with Russia appears as a necessary condition for addressing Germany’s economic problems and changing its policy toward Moscow, even as Russia continues its war against Ukraine.
Such rhetoric has practical value for the Kremlin. It shifts the debate on Russian aggression toward Germany’s economic interests, turning sanctions and military aid to Ukraine into issues of domestic political conflict. This creates additional opportunities to challenge federal government decisions and weaken political support for Ukraine.
AfD’s Contacts With Russian Entities Aim at Weakening Moscow’s Political Isolation
AfD’s contacts with Russian organizations began long before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Over time, they developed from individual political visits into high-level discussions on bilateral cooperation. In 2016, deputies Marcus Pretzell and Markus Frohnmaier visited occupied Crimea, and in 2018, representatives of the party took part in observing the presidential elections in Russia. For Moscow, these visits provided an opportunity to demonstrate that it maintained political contacts in Europe despite the international rejection of Crimea annexation and criticism of the Russian electoral system.
Further engagement focused on sanctions policy and restoring relations with Germany. In December 2020, for example, AfD co-leader Tino Chrupalla met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow. Soon afterward, in March 2021, Alice Weidel visited Russia to discuss lifting sanctions. In the summer of the same year, Chrupalla attended a conference organized by the Russian Ministry of Defense. These meetings took place as Russia was building up its military presence near Ukraine’s borders and tensions with the West were growing. Despite the worsening international situation, AfD maintained direct channels of communication with the Russian leadership and continued to promote the restoration of cooperation with Moscow.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine did not end these contacts, although it intensified internal disagreements within AfD over their acceptable forms. In September 2022, state parliament members Hans-Thomas Tillschneider, Daniel Wald, and Christian Blex visited Russia and planned to continue their trip to the occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions. AfD’s leadership prevented them from making this visit, showing that the party sought to limit the most politically sensitive initiatives. However, the continuation of such trips after the invasion showed that contacts with Russia remained in place despite Moscow’s growing international isolation.
Energy cooperation again became an important focus of these relations in 2026. In June, Markus Frohnmaier, deputy chairman of AfD’s parliamentary group and the party’s foreign policy representative, attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. There, he met Kirill Dmitriev, the Russian president’s special representative, and Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller. Discussions about the possible resumption of Nord Stream operations and Russian gas supplies to Germany shifted the debate on relations with Moscow toward economic considerations. Frohnmaier justified his participation by referring to the need to protect German economic interests. In practice, he presented the restoration of cooperation with Russia as an alternative to the current sanctions policy.
AfD representatives maintain regular contacts with Russian organizations that go beyond ordinary public statements. These include direct political dialogue, participation in Russian events, meetings with senior Russian officials, and discussions on restoring economic cooperation during the full-scale war. For Moscow, these contacts provide additional channels of communication with members of the German political system who support changes to sanctions and energy policy. This allows Russia to promote its economic and political interests within German society, while AfD uses contacts to present its foreign policy as an alternative to the federal government’s approach.
AfD’s Rhetoric Brings Moscow’s Interests into Germany’s Domestic Political Debate
AfD’s positions on Russia and Ukraine form part of its broader criticism of the federal government. The party links economic difficulties, migration policy, restrictions on the information space, and national identity to what it describes as the government’s failure to protect citizens’ interests. This approach allows AfD to incorporate foreign policy demands into a wider program of domestic political mobilization.
In its statements, the party presents support for Ukraine as a cause of Germany’s worsening economic situation. Military aid is described as a waste of money that should instead go toward social needs, infrastructure, and support for industry. At the same time, sanctions against Russia and the rejection of Russian gas are linked to higher energy prices, lower industrial output, and job losses.
This argument draws on real economic problems but explains their causes selectively. Russian invasion, the disruption of gas supplies, and Germany’s previous dependence on a single supplier receive much less attention. As a result, the issue of Russia’s responsibility is shifted toward a discussion of economic hardships and accusations against the German government, while the resumption of energy cooperation with Moscow is presented as a direct way to improve the economic situation.
AfD also presents military aid as an obstacle to peace. The party calls for negotiations with Russia but does not define the conditions needed to end the aggression and restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity. At the same time, ending military support for Kyiv effectively becomes part of its proposed approach to resolving the conflict. This line of argument shifts responsibility for the continuation of the war and seeks to create political grounds for further demands to limit aid to Ukraine.
Another part of AfD’s political messaging involves discrediting the federal government and state institutions through accusations of censorship and the suppression of alternative views. In March 2022, AfD MP Eugen Schmidt told the Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda that Germany’s ruling elite was imposing a single viewpoint and suppressing alternative political positions in the media and online. Such claims allow the party to portray criticism of Russian aggression and restrictions on Russian state media as forms of domestic censorship. This shifts the debate from Russia’s responsibility for the war toward freedom of speech and the legitimacy of decisions made by the German authorities.
AfD also uses claims of discrimination against Russian-speaking minorities and restrictions on Russian state media, repeating Moscow’s narratives. This approach expands the party’s target audience and increases its political reach by turning support for the Kremlin into an issue of voters’ domestic and cultural identity.
Russian media in Germany provide another channel for spreading these messages. These include DruschbaFM, Golos Germanii, and Berliner Telegraph. They cover the situation of Russian-speaking residents, media restrictions, sanctions, and Germany’s relations with Russia. Links between the party and civil society organizations are visible through the involvement of AfD representatives in these groups. Sergey Filbert and AfD politician Rainer Rothfuss were members of the leadership of Druschba Global e.V. Meanwhile, VADAR, an organization established to oppose discrimination against Russian-speaking residents of Germany, was led by former AfD MP Ulrich Oehme.
This structure helps spread mutually reinforcing messages through different communication channels: economic criticism fuels public dissatisfaction with the government, accusations of censorship undermine trust in official explanations, while claims of discrimination attract audiences for whom relations with Russia are closely linked to linguistic and cultural identity. Together, these narratives support demands to review assistance to Ukraine and restore cooperation with Moscow.
Russian Information Networks Use AfD to Strengthen Their Own Campaigns
Russian information operations complement the party’s messaging and provide additional channels for spreading messages that benefit Moscow. This becomes particularly important ahead of state elections in Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and Berlin, when political competition creates further opportunities to influence public debate.
Documented information campaigns show that Russian networks treat German political forces selectively. Hundreds of videos and posts have targeted German politicians and political parties in an effort to discredit them. At the same time, AfD and BSW have remained the only political forces that have not faced similar campaigns. This selective targeting is consistent with the positions these parties take on Russia and Ukraine.
Pro-Russian information networks incorporate authentic statements and materials from AfD politicians into disinformation flows alongside fabricated documents and propaganda. By using shared domains, these networks attract audiences through their familiarity with the party’s positions and then expose them to manipulative content. This allows the Kremlin to give its own narratives greater legitimacy through recognizable figures in German politics.
Both mechanisms reinforce each other. Russian information campaigns discredit AfD and BSW’s political opponents, thereby strengthening the position of these parties. At the same time, pro-Russian networks circulate statements by their representatives, expanding the parties’ reach and increasing the visibility of messages that benefit Moscow in Germany’s political debate. This support does not require direct coordination between the parties and Russian networks. Their positions already overlap, allowing Russian networks to use AfD and BSW rhetoric to advance their own interests.
Political Implications for Germany and Support for Ukraine
AfD has its own political goals, electoral interests, and program. However, the overlap between its stance and Moscow’s key demands, contacts between individual party representatives and Russian officials, and the use of party content in Russian information campaigns create conditions for these processes to reinforce each other.
Russia’s main advantage lies in its ability to promote foreign policy interests through domestic political competition in Germany. Demands to end military aid to Ukraine, lift sanctions, and restore energy cooperation with Moscow take the form of debates about economic well-being, freedom of speech, and the national interests of German citizens. This makes pro-Russian positions less politically isolated and harder to separate from broader domestic criticism of the government.
For the Kremlin, the main effect is not necessarily a change in Germany’s foreign policy. It is the creation of domestic political obstacles to the consistent implementation of that policy. When support for Ukraine remains a subject of domestic political conflict, the government faces greater difficulties in maintaining military aid and building a common position with its European partners. The use of AfD’s political agenda and its amplification through information networks gives Russia additional opportunities to complicate Germany’s policy toward Ukraine and undermine efforts to maintain a common EU position.
