Russia’s substantial wartime losses and declining effectiveness of contract-based recruitment raise growing questions about its ability to sustain the front’s manpower needs without renewed mass mobilization. IKAR’s study examines Russia’s available and emerging mechanisms for replenishing military personnel, public attitudes toward mass mobilization and its potential political consequences, and the feasibility of various mobilization scenarios. Based on these findings, the study assesses the constraints on Kremlin decision-making and forecasts measures the Russian authorities may adopt to address the projected need for hundreds of thousands of additional personnel.
The main objectives of the research include:
- Examine public attitudes in the Russian Federation toward the introduction of a new wave of mass forced mobilization, with particular attention to the potential political and social consequences of such a decision.
- Assess Russia’s actual capacity to meet the front’s manpower requirements, including the sustainability and limitations of existing military recruitment approaches.
- Identify and analyze the technologies, mechanisms, and additional recruitment capacities being developed by the Russian authorities to meet the front’s manpower requirements without conducting overt mass mobilization.
- Assess Russia’s capacity to implement various mobilization scenarios, combining formal and informal recruitment mechanisms, targeted mobilization measures, and other instruments for replenishing military manpower.
Research Methodology
This report draws on IKAR’s multi-year, comprehensive sociological research in Russia, which combines both quantitative and qualitative methods.
Representative quantitative surveys were conducted at both the national and regional levels. The surveys used CATI (Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing) methodology, which involves telephone interviews based on an interactive, structured questionnaire and specialized software for conducting sociological research.
All nationwide quantitative surveys conducted between 2022 and 2026 used the same sampling and sociodemographic parameters. The core questionnaire was repeated across all ten waves of the nationwide study, making it possible to track changes in Russians’ attitudes toward a range of issues related to the war and mobilization.
The research also covers a wide range of Russian and international media sources, including federal and regional media, official publications by government authorities, as well as popular and specialized outlets. A separate component of the research involves collecting, classification, and analysis of statistical data from open sources and specialized institutions. Information was collected and verified using open-source intelligence (OSINT) methods. In assessing the information, we considered the reliability and provenance of sources, publication dates, the completeness and context of the data, and potential political, institutional, or commercial motivations. Where possible, key factual claims and quantitative indicators were cross-checked against multiple independent sources.
AI-powered tools – OchiAI and War of Words – were used to follow Russian digital and social media in real time and to trace narratives and trends across Russian television and video content.
Key Findings
Russian society does not support a new wave of mass mobilization. This is a fundamental public attitude that Russia’s military-political leadership cannot ignore when considering such a decision. Negative attitudes toward compulsory mobilization became entrenched during and after the first wave, carried out in the autumn of 2022. Since the beginning of 2024, the share of Russians opposed to a new mobilization has remained virtually unchanged, at around three-quarters of the population.
The Russian authorities must also take into account two important changes in public attitudes since the first wave of compulsory recruitment into the army. First, the number of Russians who support compulsory mobilization has fallen by half, from 24% in early 2023 to 11% in 2026. Second, differences between age groups on this issue have narrowed.
While an absolute majority of young Russians were and remain opposed to such a step, the older generation showed considerably greater support for mass mobilization – as high as around 30% as recently as early 2023. Today, however, the differences between younger, middle-aged, and older Russians are no longer significant: an absolute majority in every age group opposes a second wave of mobilization.
Two other important factors shape public attitudes in Russia in general and perceptions of mobilization in particular: the absence of an ideological foundation for the Russian-Ukrainian war that is accepted by a majority of Russians, and the absence of a clear vision of victory in the war.
The first factor is not critical when the army relies on contract recruitment, but it becomes critical in the case of compulsory mobilization. Second, the absence of a vision of victory articulated by the state, – has a negative effect both on society’s perception of mobilization and on the willingness of large numbers of citizens to sign military contracts, even in exchange for high payments. After all, the absence of a vision of victory pushes the prospect of demobilization indefinitely into the future and, in turn, increases the perceived likelihood of being killed or seriously wounded.
Over the years of full-scale war, these risks have become increasingly apparent to most Russians and are no longer perceived as remote or unlikely, particularly given that most Russians have relatives or acquaintances who have participated in the war or been killed in action.
Russian propaganda relies on several strategic narratives to justify the war and the possibility of compulsory mobilization. The first presents the war as a struggle against fascism and, therefore, as a righteous cause. The second invokes victory in the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) as the central myth of modern Russia: by participating in the war, Russians are portrayed as repeating the feat of their grandfathers and great-grandfathers. The third narrative frames the Russian-Ukrainian war as a conflict actually being waged against Russia’s eternal and existential adversary – the collective West, while portraying Russians as the bearers and defenders of genuine universal human values. Among other things, this narrative serves to justify the protracted nature of the war and the need to mobilize all of Russia’s resources for victory, including by mobilizing a larger number of Russian men. Finally, the fourth narrative portrays participants in the war against Ukraine as modern-day heroes, drawing parallels with Soviet soldiers who liberated Europe.
The Russian authorities have failed to establish a coherent ideological foundation capable of generating mass voluntary participation by Russians in the war against Ukraine, particularly participation driven by ideological rather than material interests. On the contrary, their actions over the years have contributed to the dominance of pragmatic rather than ideological motives in decisions to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense.
As the war has continued, the state apparatus has been forced to expand its activities beyond the production of purely pro-war narratives. By 2025–2026, the stability of Russia’s political system increasingly rested on three elements: managing public discontent, restricting access to alternative sources of information, and building a system of military socialization. The first two elements are primarily reactive and aimed at managing a society for which mass compulsory mobilization is an extraordinary and highly undesirable event.
Far more important and fundamental in nature is the third element: the construction of a comprehensive system of military socialization. This system already encompasses preschool, school, and higher education in Russia. Its ultimate goal is to raise generations for whom both war and mass mobilization will be regarded as normal, and even expected, aspects of life.
The Russian authorities have learned lessons from the first wave of compulsory mobilization. By the autumn of 2026, they are significantly better prepared for partial mobilization than they were four years earlier. This applies to both the legal and administrative aspects of mobilization.
The capabilities for tracking mobilization resources, the completeness of information about their current place of residence, workplace, and immediate social circle, as well as the range of restrictive measures, including a ban on leaving the country even through allied Belarus, are now extensive. Compared with 2022, employers, both state-owned and private, will be assigned a much greater role and responsibility in the event of mass mobilization, both in notifying employees and in ensuring that, after receiving summonses, those liable for military service report to military enlistment offices. This also includes far greater capabilities for geolocating those liable for military service, which now makes it more difficult for them to evade mobilization by changing their place of residence or moving to another region of the country.
At present, Russia’s contract recruitment system has reached its ceiling. This is confirmed by the monthly number of contracts signed, the quality of manpower arriving in the armed forces, and the enormous differences in regional payments, which can amount to 1,000%. The system of mass recruitment of prisoners for combat operations, first tested by the Wagner PMC, became a state policy from 2023 onward and was also expanded to include all Russians who have problems with the law – from the stage of investigation or even simple detention through to the issuing of a court ruling. However, this approach is also incapable of significantly increasing the monthly number of contracts signed. Nor can this be achieved through the recruitment of migrants, foreigners, and Russians who have only recently obtained citizenship, the cancellation of debts for borrowers, or pressure on conscripts and reservists. In 2026, the Ministry of Defense and, especially, regional authorities had to involve employers and commission-based recruitment agencies in contract recruitment. Spending on the latter increased several times, from an average of RUB 358 million per month in 2025 to RUB 802 million per month in January–April 2026. Another category of the population increasingly targeted by recruitment efforts is Russian university students. The recruitment of young people who have not completed higher education, which intensified many times over in 2026, should be viewed less in terms of quantitative indicators and more as an attempt to improve the quality of recruited contract soldiers. Formally, students are recruited into the Unmanned Systems Forces rather than conventional infantry units. De facto, however, there is no separate Ministry of Defense contract for students, and after signing a contract, they may ultimately be sent to serve as ordinary assault troops. In practice, the recruitment of students as a higher-quality mobilization resource is carried out through a combination of financial incentives, false promises regarding conditions of service, and administrative coercion. Trends in recent months indicate that recruitment of this particular category of those liable for military service will only intensify, regardless of whether mass compulsory mobilization begins or not.
Possible Mobilization Scenarios
Inertial Scenario: Low Probability
A scenario in which Russia continues to rely primarily on a “mercenary” model of military recruitment, combined with non-monetary incentives for signing a contract, such as the termination of criminal proceedings or obtaining Russian citizenship, is viable only if the intensity of Russia’s offensive operations declines. This is even more important if no new fronts are opened, either against Ukraine or against other states or blocs.
Through its statements, actions, and preparations, Moscow has demonstrated that it does not intend to reduce the intensity of hostilities against Ukraine and does not rule out expanding the front by hundreds of kilometers. Under these conditions, and given the fundamental change in the nature of warfare resulting from the widespread use of drones, which is driving steadily increasing personnel losses, the current pace of contract recruitment is no longer sufficient. Maintaining the current rate of replenishment of Russia’s armed forces is already difficult, and as the war continues, this challenge will become increasingly difficult to overcome even without further escalation.
Russia’s military-political leadership demonstrated in 2022 that, when necessary, it is prepared to abandon an inertial approach and make decisions without relying on its own propaganda or overly optimistic military reports.
Open Mass Mobilization: Medium Probability
The scenario of open mass mobilization is actively discussed in Russian society and among Russian elites. Anxiety is heightened both by the authoritarian nature of decision-making and by previous experience: both the full-scale invasion and the first wave of mass mobilization were preceded only by rumors, while the Kremlin denied that such plans existed.
The need for a sharp increase in the flow of personnel into the Russian army became evident in 2023. At the same time, the risks associated with compulsory mass mobilization are equally clear. It could cross what is effectively the only remaining “red line” for Russian society. The argument that mobilization is necessary to demobilize those forcibly recruited since 2022 is unlikely to be sufficient, as Russian society shows little empathy even toward this category of servicemen.
Open mass mobilization would also undermine the “Special Military Operation” framework, for which Russian propaganda has yet to offer an alternative. Ultimately, this would mean resorting to one of the two most extreme instruments still available to Russia: mass mobilization and the use of nuclear weapons. If this threat fails to produce the desired outcome, namely real and rapid gains on the battlefield, the Kremlin would be left with only one remaining option, which under current conditions would receive no support from Russian society, China, or the Global South.
Despite these risks, this scenario has a medium probability, given the Kremlin’s previous decision-making record and the frequently irrational nature of its decisions. If such a resolution takes place, the authorities are likely to seek to carry out the new compulsory recruitment campaign within a short timeframe, drawing on the lessons of the first mobilization wave. Recruitment would likely avoid concentrating efforts in the largest cities, instead in regions with the lowest one-time contract payments. This approach would help compensate for shortfalls caused by financial constraints on regional budgets while also reducing the negative media impact.
Hybrid Mobilization: High Probability
At this stage, hybrid mobilization is the most likely scenario, combining elements of the two previous scenarios. Given the clear limitations of the inertial approach and the risks associated with open mass mobilization, Russia’s military-political leadership is likely to view a hybrid approach as the most effective option.
Open compulsory mobilization would primarily have a negative effect on public perceptions of the federal government. By contrast, increasing mandatory regional quotas for the monthly recruitment of Russian men into the armed forces, while allowing regional authorities to choose between contract recruitment and compulsory mobilization, is intended to shift public discontent toward local authorities.
Hybrid mobilization, combining financial and other incentives with additional compulsory recruitment, would allow Russia to increase pressure on the battlefield while spreading the resulting social and political costs over time. This approach is consistent with Vladimir Putin’s demonstrated willingness to continue the war for an indefinite period. In Moscow’s view, sustained pressure on the battlefield, combined with a gradual expansion of the military contingent rather than merely replacing losses, should eventually produce results and enable Russia to achieve its objectives through military means alone.
In addition, a gradual hybrid mobilization would help prevent the military training and deployment system from becoming overloaded while allowing Russia to recruit roughly the same number of personnel as during the first wave of compulsory mobilization. Accordingly, after the State Duma elections, systematic contract recruitment is likely to continue, alongside a noticeable increase in cases of compulsory mobilization.
Each scenario outlined above is relevant to the short-term outlook and to planning appropriate responses. Russia’s state apparatus is completing its transition to a mobilization model that can be implemented in waves and at different levels of scale, from partial to general mobilization. Russia is now significantly better prepared for mobilization than in 2022, and likely better prepared than any other country in 2026.
The Russian Ministry of Defense already has a clear understanding of the available mobilization pool and is continuously expanding its capacity to obtain more complete and up-to-date information about it. At the same time, administrative mechanisms for compelling those liable for military service to comply with mobilization orders are being further developed.
However, the data presented in this report and the analysis of the Russian authorities’ approach to mobilization are even more important for understanding the medium- and long-term outlook. From this perspective, it matters less whether Russia conducts compulsory mobilization this year or next. Alongside the systematic registration and monitoring of the mobilization pool, a much more fundamental process is underway: the creation of a new mobilization pool better suited to the conditions of permanent war.
This process can be described as military socialization. It involves preschool, secondary, and higher education, quasi-civil society, the church, the media, culture, and other spheres. In the medium and long term, the main objective is to shape generations for whom, unlike the current ones, mobilization will be perceived not as an extraordinary event, but as planned and even expected.
