The use of foreign nationals presented by Russian officials and state media as “international observers” or “experts” has become a regular feature of efforts to legitimize Russian elections. Unlike professional monitoring missions, which follow established methodologies and assess the entire electoral cycle, these observers often make short visits, attend a limited number of polling stations, and draw conclusions that go far beyond what they directly observed. The European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE) describes this practice as politically biased or fake election observation.
Russia’s presidential election on March 15–17, 2024 provides a clear example. Russia did not invite an OSCE/ODIHR observation mission, depriving Russian voters of an independent and comprehensive assessment based on established international methodology. At the same time, Russian authorities reported 1,115 foreign “observers and experts” from 129 countries.
The composition of these delegations is important. Alongside former politicians and representatives of small political parties, they include activists, bloggers, journalists from alternative and pro-Russian media, and individuals with no institutional mandate to conduct professional election observation.
External Legitimation Through Alternative Observation Missions
Foreign “observers” help Russia compensate for the lack of recognized international monitoring by creating an alternative foreign presence. Their positive comments are then used to support claims that elections are “legal,” “transparent,” and “democratic.”
Professional expertise in election monitoring is less important in this model. More useful is a combination of foreign nationality, public or professional status, a predictable political position, willingness to speak to the media, and freedom from institutional accountability.
Creating an Image of International Recognition
Limited participation by recognized international institutions and critical assessments from Western governments make it harder to present Russian elections as enjoying broad international recognition. Moscow addresses this gap by bringing in individual foreign observers, experts, and public figures.
In public communication, these participants can be identified primarily by nationality and status: a “French observer,” an “American lawyer,” a “Serbian professor,” or an “expert from Romania.” This gives one person’s positive assessment a broader international meaning.
André Chanclu and Giorgio Deskovich Deschi illustrate this approach. Both are EU citizens, but neither represents the official electoral institutions of their countries. Both had established links to Russia and pro-Russian groups long before taking part in Russian electoral events.
Chanclu has been active for years in French pro-Russian and far-right circles. He was associated with Groupe Union Défense and Ordre nouveau, co-founded Collectif France-Russie and Comité France-Donbass, and used Novopole to develop contacts between the French far right and pro-Russian groups in eastern Ukraine.
In 2022, Chanclu participated as a foreign “observer” in Russia’s pseudo-referendum in the occupied part of Kherson Oblast. In 2023, he took part in Russian “elections” in the occupied part of Donetsk Oblast.
Giorgio Deskovich Deschi has a different but functionally similar profile. His political activity is linked to the movement seeking to restore the so-called “Free Territory of Trieste” and to the idea of territorial self-determination. He founded Liberazione Triestina and, since 2024, has headed Osservatorio Libero di Trieste, which lists Moscow as one of its centers of activity.
Deschi’s contacts with Russian structures go back many years. In 2015, Italian media reported his involvement in arranging meetings between Trieste activists and representatives of the Russian Embassy in Rome. He later developed contacts with Abkhazia and other groups associated with partially recognized and unrecognized territories.
In 2023, Deschi participated in Russian “elections” in the occupied part of Luhansk Oblast and publicly described the voting as democratic and transparent. In 2024, he also took part in observing Russia’s presidential election.
The two cases show the same mechanism. Rather than bringing in foreigners with no established position on Russia, the Russian side relies on public figures who already operate in political environments favorable to Moscow. Their nationality allows their statements to be presented as voices from France or Italy even though neither participant has an official mandate from those countries.
This creates an alternative image of international recognition. In place of support from recognized institutions, Russian messaging highlights individual foreign supporters and uses their presence to argue that official Western positions do not represent the views of all Europeans.
Giving Elections Legal and Expert Authority
Statements by Russian officials and positive comments from foreign “observers” have limited persuasive value on their own. A speaker’s professional credentials can give the same claims greater authority. This makes lawyers, attorneys, and former judges useful participants because their assessments can be presented in the language of law and professional expertise.
Arnaud Develay, Goran Petronijević, and J. Kline Preston IV fit this profile. In addition to their legal backgrounds, all three had links to Russia before participating in Russian electoral events.
Arnaud Develay is a particularly clear example. The French lawyer specialized in international criminal and humanitarian law, worked with former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, and was part of legal teams connected with the defense of Saddam Hussein and Ilich Ramírez Sánchez.
Develay lived in the United States for many years before moving to Russia in 2022. Even before becoming involved in Russian electoral events, he supported the concept of a multipolar world and criticized U.S. and NATO policies.
In Russia, Develay interacted with organizations promoting Russian narratives about Ukraine. He spoke at an informal UN Security Council meeting and helped prepare materials for the so-called “International Public Tribunal on the Crimes of Ukrainian Neo-Nazis and Their Accomplices.”
In 2022 and 2023, he participated in Russian electoral events in occupied Ukrainian territories and gave them positive assessments. No separate methodological report by Develay providing a comprehensive assessment of the electoral process is available in open sources.
J. Kline Preston IV serves a similar function, with his U.S. citizenship adding further symbolic value. Preston has spent many years engaged in Russia-related legal work, presented himself as a specialist in Russian law, and advocated better U.S.-Russian relations.
After Russia’s 2011 parliamentary elections, he described the vote as free and fair. Preston later participated repeatedly in Russian-organized observation missions, including Russian “elections” in occupied Ukrainian territories in 2023 and the 2024 presidential election.
His comments focused mainly on the visible organization of voting and the operation of individual polling stations. They did not include a systematic assessment of political competition, the media environment, candidate access, or the legality of holding Russian elections in occupied territories. Preston has never represented the U.S. government or an official American election observation mission.
Goran Petronijević adds the status of a Serbian lawyer and former judge. He is associated with the Belgrade-based Russian Express media center, of which he is the actual owner, and has participated in Russian electoral events alongside representatives of this organization.
His legal and judicial background allows a positive assessment of voting to be presented as a professional judgment rather than simply political support. At the same time, Petronijević’s established links to Russia’s public and media environment remain important when assessing the independence of such statements.
Professional credentials therefore become part of the Legitimation mechanism. The audience is directed toward the foreign lawyer’s qualifications, while the scope, methodology, and criteria of the observation receive less attention. A political message can consequently be presented as an external professional assessment.
Providing Academic Validation
Foreign political scientists, academics, and researchers serve a separate function. Their academic credentials allow positive assessments of Russian elections to move beyond claims about the technical organization of voting and into broader debates about sovereignty, international relations, and foreign interference.
Srđan Perišić, a Serbian political scientist, lecturer at the University of East Sarajevo, and former adviser to Milorad Dodik, provides a clear example. His involvement in Russian electoral events extends over several years.
In 2020, the Russian Civic Chamber invited Perišić as a foreign “expert” to observe the vote on amendments to the Russian Constitution. The vote took place without official international observation by OSCE/ODIHR or PACE.
In 2022, he visited occupied Donbas as part of an international group formed by the Russian side. He later participated as an “observer” in the pseudo-referendum in the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
In 2023, Perišić visited Russian “elections” in the occupied part of Donetsk Oblast, including polling stations in Novoazovsk, Mariupol, and Donetsk. He argued that the voting complied with Russian law and the Russian Constitution and that the armed conflict did not call the legality of the process into question.
His public rhetoric goes well beyond what he observed at individual polling stations. Perišić interprets international politics through the concepts of state sovereignty and Western interference. He has argued, for example, that Western-funded NGOs are used to influence elections and organize “color revolutions.”
This position places his positive assessment of Russian elections within a broader narrative in which Western criticism can itself be portrayed as political interference. At the same time, Perišić has not published a comprehensive report explaining his observation methodology, the criteria used to select polling stations, or his assessment of political competition, the media environment, possible coercion, vote counting, and complaint procedures.
His academic status therefore gives the argument a broader intellectual frame. Questions about electoral standards can be recast as part of a geopolitical dispute, while the Russian position is presented as a political-science interpretation rather than simply an official claim.
Producing Independent-Looking Media Testimony
Foreign journalists, bloggers, and owners of their own media platforms serve another purpose. They can carry Russian narratives into foreign information environments through sources that are formally separate from Russian state media.
Sebastián Salgado, Sonja van den Ende, and Thomas Röper represent this profile. All three have gained access to Russian-occupied territories and have their own means of distributing material to foreign audiences. The conditions under which they received this access, as well as their previous links to Russia’s information environment, are important to understanding their role.
Sebastián Salgado offers access to Spanish-speaking audiences. The Argentine journalist runs the Data Urgente platform, has worked for teleSUR, Mexico’s TVC, and HispanTV, and has taught journalism at the National University of La Plata.
In August 2022, he visited occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and produced the documentary project Tango de Libertad en Lugansk. The project later received the Khaled Alkhateb International Memorial Award, established by Russia Today.
In September 2023, Salgado participated in Russian “elections” in the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Shortly before the “vote,” he told Argentina’s Radio Nacional that he had come to Russia at the invitation of the Russian government as an international observer. His role therefore moved beyond journalistic coverage of Russian-occupied territories to direct participation in an electoral process organized by the Russian side.
Sonja van den Ende shows a similar pattern. She has repeatedly visited occupied territories on trips organized by the Russian side. During one such press tour, the group followed a predetermined schedule and relied on the hosts for access to the territory.
In 2022, van den Ende participated in the pseudo-referendum in the occupied part of Luhansk Oblast. In 2023, she took part in Russian “elections” in the occupied part of Kherson Oblast. Her testimony has also been used in Russia’s international messaging. In May 2022, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, brought her into a Russian-organized event where she appeared as a Dutch journalist who had personally visited the occupied territories.
Thomas Röper represents the most sustained version of this model. He is a German citizen, lives in St. Petersburg, and runs the German-language website Anti-Spiegel.
In 2022, Röper acted as an “observer” at the pseudo-referendum in the occupied part of Kherson Oblast. He participated in Russian “elections” in occupied territories in 2023 and again appeared among foreign participants in the 2024 presidential election.
Anti-Spiegel allows Röper to distribute his assessments directly to German-speaking audiences. In 2025, the Council of the EU placed him under sanctions, citing Anti-Spiegel’s role in spreading Russian disinformation and his involvement in legitimizing Russian electoral procedures in occupied Ukrainian territories.
The main value of this profile is that it changes the apparent source of the message. A Russian narrative enters a foreign media environment through a foreign journalist who cites personal experience and distributes the account through his or her own channels. For the foreign audience, the message no longer appears to come directly from Russian officials.
The same testimony can then be cited by Russian media and officials as external confirmation. A narrative therefore moves between Russian and foreign information environments while acquiring the appearance of additional independent validation.
Creating an Image of Support from “Civil Society”
Representatives of foreign civic organizations provide another form of external validation. The name of an organization and the formal position of its leader can make a private opinion appear to represent a broader segment of foreign civil society.
Camelia Dorina Pop illustrates this profile. A Romanian citizen who has lived in Italy for many years, Pop heads the Association for Social Promotion Friends of Romania in the European Union (APSARUE). The organization was established in Italy in 2014. At the time, Pop worked as a commercial consultant; she later obtained a law degree.
Her involvement in Russian electoral activities began before the “elections” in occupied territories. In 2021, Pop attended a conference in Moscow on the role of civil society in ensuring democratic election standards. In 2022, she became involved in the Russian campaign surrounding the pseudo-referendums.
In 2023, Pop participated in Russian “elections” in the occupied part of Luhansk Oblast as a representative of APSARUE. She praised preparations at polling stations and the work of election staff, said she had seen no violations, and spoke of voters’ “hope for change.”
Pop, however, held no mandate from Romania, Italy, or EU institutions, while APSARUE does not represent either the Romanian diaspora as a whole or European civil society. Nevertheless, her nationality and the organization’s name allow her to be presented as an “expert from Romania” or a “representative of a European civic organization.” A private position can therefore acquire a degree of symbolic representation that exceeds the participant’s actual institutional mandate.
Building a Network of Predictable and Tested Observers
Beyond individual communication tasks, Russian authorities have developed a recurring pool of foreign participants who can be invited to electoral events again. Many of the individuals examined in this report have taken part over several years in Russian elections and pseudo-referendums, conferences, press tours, and organized visits to occupied territories. Moscow therefore has access to participants whose political positions, public behavior, and ability to distribute messages are already known.
Repeated participation also works as a selection mechanism. Organizers know whether a participant is willing to speak publicly, what type of assessment they are likely to provide, and which audiences they can reach. Individuals who have previously given positive assessments of Russian electoral procedures and repeated narratives close to Moscow’s position become predictable candidates for future events.
The diversity of this network makes it useful for different communication needs. A political activist can signal political support, a lawyer adds legal authority, an academic provides intellectual credibility, a journalist carries the message into foreign media, and an NGO representative creates an image of civil-society support. The same basic claims can therefore reach audiences through several formally independent foreign sources.
Conclusion
This model allows Moscow to partly compensate for the lack of independent international observation and broader external recognition of Russian electoral procedures. In place of institutional assessment, it creates a functional substitute: a collection of positive statements from foreign observers whose nationality, profession, or public status allows them to be presented as independent external voices.
The practice combines formal external independence with predictable content. The Kremlin has developed a repeatable mechanism in which foreign lawyers, academics, journalists, activists, and representatives of civic organizations reinforce similar claims from different positions. Support from a limited number of sympathetic participants can therefore be presented as evidence of broader international approval, used to counter criticism from Western governments and international institutions, and carried into foreign information environments.
The result is a gap between how these participants are presented and whom they actually represent. Nationality, professional credentials, and organizational affiliation create an appearance of external authority, but the individuals examined here do not speak on behalf of their governments, recognized international monitoring missions, or professional election observation bodies. Their private assessments can nevertheless be used in public communication as a substitute for precisely this kind of institutional validation.
