Monitoring Russian Narratives Regarding Moldova: 19-25.05.2025

Monitoring Russian Narratives Regarding Moldova: 19-25.05.2025

The Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia, together with Watchdog MD, prepared a weekly monitoring of Russian propaganda attempts to interfere in the electoral process in Moldova and its attempts to influence the domestic political situation in this country. This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union and Equal Rights & Independent Media (ERIM). Its contents are the sole responsibility of IKAR-WatchDog.MD and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EU and ERIM.

The weekly monitoring report aims to study social media to identify key propaganda narratives, trending topics, active propagandists, and audience engagement statistics related to Moldova’s political landscape. The data is collected from the Russian segment of Telegram using AI-powered tools and manual sampling.

Key findings for 19-25 May 2025:

  1. We note the emergence of several new and recurrent attack themes of Russian propaganda against Moldova and the Chișinău authorities: accusations of involvement in the elections in Romania, territorial claims against Ukraine, and a return to pro-USSR historical themes.
  2. The statements of the Romanian presidential candidate George Simion and Pavel Durov have been intensively exploited by Russian propaganda to launch accusations of fraud against several countries, including Moldova and France. The aim was an attempt to delegitimize the elections in Romania following the loss of the elections by the candidate supported by the so-called sovereignist and pro-Russian current. At the same time, there has been an intensification of disinformation campaigns against France in order to present it as Russia’s main enemy. In particular, this has fueled the EU violates Member States’ interests narrative.
  3. Victoria Furtună’s statements about Ukraine’s retrocession of Budzhak in favor of Moldova are part of a broad campaign to discredit Moldovan-Ukrainian relations, which is convenient for Russia. At the same time, the idea of reclaiming Ukrainian territories was also previously identified among Kremlin-affiliated politicians in Romania, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary and used by the Kremlin to promote anti-Ukraine propaganda.
  4. Contrary to earlier predictions, Russian propagandists continue to promote historical themes even after May 9 has passed. This points to the existence of a campaign to promote Soviet nostalgia started in Russia and distributed on Moldovan channels with the aim of antagonizing society and decreasing support for the EU.
  5. In terms of political figures promoted by Russian propaganda, we observe a clear trend of constant appearances of politicians affiliated to Ilan Șor, such as the Bashkan of Gagauzia, Evghenia Guțul, but also pro-Russian political figures: Igor Dodon and Irina Vlah. The veiled criticism of former Bashkan Irina Vlah can be interpreted as attempts to distance her from the Kremlin-backed network in order to attract center and center-left voters who are not necessarily pro-Russian.

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