ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUM IN MOLDOVA: perception in Russian media and social networks

ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUM IN MOLDOVA: perception in Russian media and social networks

Since the official launch of the electoral campaign in Moldova in August 2024, Russian propaganda, media outlets, and social networks have engaged in extensive discussions concerning the elections. This is confirmed by the analysis of messages on Russian TV channels and video platforms, using the specialized AI-powered tool War of Words and AI-powered platform Osavul for comprehensive social media research.

Russian television has frequently featured presidential candidates, with a notable emphasis on Maia Sandu, compared to the opposition candidate, Alexander Stoianoglo, and other political figures. This heightened focus on Moldova’s pro-European president reflects a strategic effort to cultivate a negative perception of Maia Sandu within the Russian audience.

The discourse surrounding the Moldovan elections closely intersects with the Transnistria issue on propaganda channels and the RuTube platform. Notably, references to Transnistria during the pre-election campaign often exceeded those related to the elections themselves.

In addition to the discussions on TV channels, social networks in Russia became a place for vibrant discussions regarding the presidential elections and the referendum in Moldova. On the day of voting, Telegram messages about the Moldovan presidential elections garnered over 2 million views. The total view count for messages in the Russian segment of Telegram on October 20-21 surpassed 4.35 million, accompanied by more than 81 thousand reactions.

As noted in the propaganda broadcasts, conversations about Maia Sandu largely prevailed in the Russian Telegram space, significantly outnumbering discussions about Alexander Stoianoglo and other candidates.

Among the 482 sources that reported on the Moldovan elections during the voting and counting period, 150 Telegram channels demonstrated connections with Kremlin information campaigns and public opinion manipulation strategies aimed at influencing audiences.

Notably, the engagement of these compromised sources during the Moldovan election coverage was double the average involvement seen in other influence operations, which typically hovers around 15%. On election day, this engagement rate exceeded 31%.

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