SECOND ROUND OF ELECTIONS IN MOLDOVA: involvement of Russian propaganda

SECOND ROUND OF ELECTIONS IN MOLDOVA: involvement of Russian propaganda

Media monitoring of the first round of the presidential elections in Moldova revealed clear signs of a targeted information campaign from the Russian Federation aimed at swaying the vote. Discussions in Russian media, especially on propaganda television channels and the Telegram platform, frequently featured sharp criticism of President Maia Sandu and her political agenda. The share of sources distributing propaganda materials on Telegram was 31%, twice the average. This was the level of Russian propaganda involvement before and during the first round of the presidential elections in Moldova.

The subsequent analysis conducted by the Institute for Conflict Study and Analysis of Russia indicated that, between the first round of voting and the announcement of the results for the second round, Russian media continued their campaign against Maia Sandu, thereby intensifying efforts to influence the election outcomes in Moldova.

Russian television often portrayed President Sandu negatively during this time, mentioning her far more frequently than her opponent, opposition candidate Alexander Stoianoglo. Both candidates received considerable attention in Russian Telegram, where discussions also leaned heavily negatively toward Ms. Sandu and her pro-European policies.

Between October 22 and November 4, 2024, over 1,500 original posts were published, accumulating nearly 9 million views. The peak viewership occurred on election day and October 25, just before Georgia’s parliamentary elections.

Notably, on election day, the share of compromised sources covering the second round of Moldova’s presidential elections exceeded 26%, mirroring similar figures from Georgia’s election day.

The active role of Russian propaganda and its attempts to influence the presidential elections in Moldova underscore Russia’s commitment to shifting the country’s geopolitical direction. The involvement of propaganda and compromised sources was twice the average observed in other information campaigns and influence operations.

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